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JUDICIAL FORGING OF A POLITICAL
WEAPON: THE IMPACT OF THE COLD
WAR ON THE LAW OF CONTEMPT
MELVIN B.
I.

LEWIS*

THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPT JURISPRUDENCE

Contempt, in its legal sense, is a concept under whose rubric a
court or legislative body punishes acts which impede the performance of its official function. The details of its provenance are unclear. It arose, however, at a time in English history when the
powers of the monarch were absolute, and the judicial and parliamentary functions were subservient to royal authority. Thus, a disrespectful act directed toward such a body was defiance of the
crown itself, and the contempt power was designed to vindicate
royal authority.
In light of the exalted status of the offended institution and its
presumptively unimpeachable integrity and objectivity, the exercise of the contempt power was not attended by safeguards against
abuse. There was no need for evidence to prove that which the king
or his surrogate claimed to know. "In England, in cases of [contempt], the charge could be made by the King in his courts, without
any evidence and against all evidence."'

If no code denounced the

specific conduct under consideration, the crown was not constrained
by any prohibition against ex post facto legislation.
At the time of the adoption of the Magna Carta, the contempt
power had been established firmly as a legislative power. English
authorities are in conflict as to whether courts were empowered to
punish contempt summarily and without process prior to the reign
of Elizabeth 1.2 The notes of Justice Wilmot in an aborted, but noteworthy, 1765 proceeding known as Almon's Case recite that the
power had existed from "immemorial usage and practice" with precedent as ancient "as supports the whole fabric of the common
law."3 Wilmot, who viewed the contempt process as a product of the
divine right of kings, asserts that because it predated the Magna
* Professor Melvin B. Lewis served as a faculty member of The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois, since 1971 and passed away July 5, 1993.
1. Creekmore v. United States, 237 F. 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1916).
2. SIR JOHN C. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT viii-ix (1927).
3.

RONALD GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 16-17

(1963). The proceed-

ings were dropped after a change of ministry. A contributing factor was the fact
that the wrong name had been entered on the writ. Id.
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Carta, contempt was not affected by the provision within that document prohibiting imprisonment except per legem terrae.4 On that
rationale, summary punishment without legal process was deemed
a proper part of English jurisprudence in cases of contempt.,
Before the nineteenth century, summary contempt power had
been exercised by English courts in only three cases,6 all of them
responding to defamation of Lord Mansfield. 7 Contempt judgments
were principally employed by Parliament to punish derogatory expressions, circulation of impertinent petitions, and unauthorized
disclosure of intracameral debates.8 During colonial times, the
American legislatures exercised a contempt power derived from
parliamentary precedent. 9
Although the United States came into being in an atmosphere
of resentment toward monarchial excesses, the contempt remedy
was an accepted part of American law at the time of the Revolution.
An early Congressional enactment provided, inter alia, that federal
courts "shall have power to ...punish by fine or imprisonment, at

the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause
or hearing ... ."10

The federal courts construed that statute as

conferring upon them a contempt power "according to such established rules and principles of the common law as were applicableto
our situation."" The underscored portion of that quotation must be
regarded as suggesting that American political philosophy mandated modification of the English contempt model.
Almost from its inception as a political body, Congress employed the contempt process to punish defiance of its authority.
Until 1857,12 both houses of Congress summarily punished such offenses as scandalous publication, attacks upon its members, and refusal to respond to questions propounded by its committees. Each
chamber was autonomous in contempt proceedings, and the courts
4. Id. at 17.
5. Fox, supra note 2, at 5-8.
6. Id. at 16.
7. Id; see GOLDFARB, supra note 3, at 19.
8. See generally 13 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY

OF ENGLISH LAW

508-09 (A.G. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1952) (describing the various contempt proceedings of Parliament).
9. For an historical view of legislative contempt with an emphasis on the
Cold War period, see generally CARL

BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: A STUDY
OF THE PROSECUTIONS INITIATED BY THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVI-

(1959).
10. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789).

TIES

11. Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 276 (1889) (emphasis added).

12. An 1857 statute, 11 Stat. 155 (1857), classified defiance of Congressional subpoenas and refusal to answer questions as misdemeanors. BECK,
supra note 9, at 7. Although the legislative contempt power still exists as a
theoretical proposition, it has fallen into disuse. Id. Such contempts now are
prosecuted as statutory violations.
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granted no relief to persons thus imprisoned. 13
Popular distaste toward authoritarian practices tended to restrict the republic's use of the contempt remedy. In 1826, a federal
judge, James H. Peck, imposed a contempt sentence upon a lawyer
who had published a letter in a newspaper which Judge Peck considered libelous against himself. 14 In consequence, Peck was impeached by the House of Representatives and brought to trial before
the Senate. 15 The hearings lasted for almost a year 16 and involved,
in part, a debate on whether the American judicial contempt power
17
was inherent or a creature of legislation.
Although the Senate acquitted Peck by a vote of twenty-two to
twenty-one,' 8 Congress reacted with a statute designed to limit the
reach of the federal contempt power. 19 That 1831 statute provided:
That the power of the several courts of the United States to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court
shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of
any person or persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of
any of the officers of the said courts in their official transactions, and
the disobedience or resistance . . . to any
20 lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree or command of said courts.
That Statutory provision, with minor stylistic changes, remains in
effect to the present day. 2 1
Section 2 of the 1831 Statute created the crime of obstruction of
justice through threats and bribery. The maximum penalty was a
$500 fine or three months of imprisonment. Such offenses were required to be prosecuted by normal criminal procedure rather than
through contempt, unless the offenses were committed in the courtroom or an immediately adjacent facility. 22 Statutory criminal
prosecution was thereby established as an alternative to some
forms of contempt.
13. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 481 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375).

14.

GOLDFARB,

supra note 3, at 21; Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Con-

tempt By Publication In The United States, 28 COLOM. L.

REV.

423-31 (1928).

Judge Peck imposed a penalty of 24 hours of confinement, and a suspension
from practice in Peck's court for a period of 18 months. Nelles & King, supra, at

429. The extent of the hardship imposed by the suspension is a matter of con-

jecture, since the contemnor may be presumed to have had little enthusiasm for

practice in that court. The period of confinement, however, is fairly emblematic
of the practices of that era.
15. Nelles & King, supra note 14, at 429.
16. Id; see GOLDFARB, supra note 3, at 21.
17. Fox, supra note 2, at 202-03.
18. GOLDFARB, supra note 3, at 21; Nelles & King, supra note 14, at 430.
19. An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, ch. 99, 2

Stat. 487 (1831).
20. Id.
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) (regarding current codification of Congress'
power to punish contempt).
22. Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 277 (1889).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:3

The modest punishments contemplated by that statutory
scheme were representative of the restrained approach of that period. For more than a century, contempt sentences consisted of
small fines or confinement for a few days. The contempt prosecution in 1909 of a southern sheriff named Shipp is emblematic of
that restraint.23 The United States Supreme Court had ordered a
stay of execution of a condemned prisoner in Shipp's custody. 2 4 The
order excited substantial local resentment. 2 5 Shipp stood by without interfering while a lynch mob took the prisoner from Shipp's jail
26
and hanged him.

That repugnant act was punished as contempt of the Supreme
Court itself. It would be difficult to imagine a more serious contempt. The offense entailed the maximum possible degree of aggravation. The offender was entrusted with a special public duty to
obey the order; and the defiance was directed at the highest level of
the American judiciary. Shipp's sentence reflected the gravity of
his offense as perceived by the customs of that period, incarceration
27
for three months.
II.

THE POSTWAR ASCENDANCE OF AMERICAN ANTICOMMUNISM:
AN OVERVIEW

Almost from the outset of the Russian revolution, American officialdom had considered communism a threat. The Bolsheviks
were of particular concern because they both advocated the use of
force to achieve a communist society and controlled the Russian Social Democratic Party during the revolutionary period. The Senate
had ordered an investigation of Bolshevik propaganda as early as
1919.28

As might have been expected, the concept of subversion received an extravagant interpretation. During World War I, a few
forlorn Socialists were found operating hand-cranked duplicating
devices for the publication of 15,000 copies of a handbill opposing
the military draft. They were duly criminalized as a "clear and
present danger" to the nation by no less a totemic figure then Oliver
Wendell Holmes. 29 A few years later, the Supreme Court, over
Holmes' dissent, applied that characterization to the post-war publication of an indecipherable and turgid pamphlet entitled The Left
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

United States v. Shipp, 215 U.S. 580 (1909).
United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386, 403 (1909).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405.
United States v. Shipp, 215 U.S. 580, 582 (1909).

28. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on Bolshevik Propaganda, 65th
Cong., 3d Sess. 7469 (1919).

29. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 53 (1919).
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Wing Manifesto.30
The American public ultimately came to view the words Russian, Socialist, Communist, and Bolshevik as synonyms. Antipathy
toward Bolshevism and Soviet-Communism was based on a literal
reading of the Marxist-Leninist view that the ultimate victory of
the proletariat, although the inevitable product of Hegelian dialec31
tic, could be attained only through violence.
The ascendancy of the Bolsheviks within the Soviet Union engendered worldwide concern for the preservation of the established
order of things. The impact of that concern was felt strongly in the
United States. The Palmer raids, directed against suspected subversives during the 1920s, featured official approval of vigilante activity. They were directed largely by John Edgar Hoover, who a few
years later would achieve iconic status as the nation's arbiter of ideological rectitude. Deportation of numerous aliens, who were unable to point to a record of support for majoritarian political
doctrine, was among the means adopted for the purging of unwelcome dogma.
The Soviet Union entered World War II in a cynical coalition
with the Third Reich. That alliance ended when Hitler mounted
one of history's least rational ventures: the invasion of Russia while
still engaged in warfare against the western powers. Within the
United States, antipathy toward communist ideology was largely
muted after the Soviet Union became an Allied power.
At the war's end, the American objective was demobilization
and resumption of the pursuit of happiness, prosperity, and the production of consumer goods. The Soviet objective was expansion of
its sphere of influence. The American tradition of hostility toward
Bolshevism was revitalized by Soviet tactics of the type which necessitated the Berlin airlift. American officialdom and public
quickly arrived at a consensus: Soviet expansionism must be resisted, and resumption of a peacetime ambience was impossible.
Nation after nation fell within the Soviet orbit, and an atypical
form of communist takeover occurred in China. America responded
with the Truman Doctrine, proclaiming its determination to resist
the further spread of communism in every part of the world. In
effect, we were again at war. It was termed a Cold War because of
the absence of armed conflict, but that would come soon enough in
Korea.
War, regardless of its temperature, is an activity which only a
despot can pursue effectively. Spinoza aptly taught that mankind
30. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

31. For an illustration of this reasoning, see excerpts from THE LEFT WING
MANIFESTO,

in Gitlow, 263 U.S. at 656 n.23.
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invariably will choose tyranny over chaos. In wartime, those often
are the only available options.
That proposition is supererogatory in its application to dictatorships. Spinoza's proposition also applies, although less forcefully, to nations which normally profess devotion to the concept of
civil liberties. Whether through hysteria or an unhealthy passion
for the exercise of power, officialdom frequently reacts with draconian excesses to crises, whether real or imagined. The public often
tends to support such actions, thereby vindicating Spinoza's thesis.
A dramatic illustration of that tendency during World War II was
the dispossession and incarceration of 100,000 native citizens without charges, process or trial, simply because their ancestors had
lived in Japan.
In many respects, the American public response to the Cold
War attained a comparable level of thoughtfulness. The Soviet
threat was very real, but paranoia is not too strong a word with
which to describe the political orthodoxy of that period. The Cincinnati National League baseball team made its contribution to national security by changing its name from the Reds to the Redlegs.
One may presume that in consequence of that demonstration of ideological conformity, their subsequent errors on the playing field
were ascribed charitably to athletic ineptitude rather than to subversive malevolence.
It is difficult to recreate in a clinical setting the atmosphere of
paranoid xenophobia which characterized that period. Fear of internal subversion intensified abhorrence toward communism. The
Rosenberg and Hiss cases brought the danger into sharp focus, and
American communists were viewed as presumptively disloyal.
Eventually, all liberal ideology became suspect. The demagoguery
of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy made every expression of
dissent vulnerable to challenge as an attempt to advance the interests of the Soviet Union over those of the United States. Nationally
televised Congressional hearings in which suspects frequently
refused to answer questions concerning past political affiliations,
reinforced the general sense that endemic disloyalty had created a
peril to the security of the nation. Steps were taken to protect the
public from exposure to disloyal doctrine. The sanitizing endeavors
included the expulsion from the entertainment industry of persons
deemed politically unreliable. Denounced actors were not suffered
even to recite without deviation lines written by authors whose loyalty was unquestioned. In every aspect of American society, acceptance required a demonstration of undeviating adherence to
majoritarian doctrine.

19931

Judicial Forging of a Political Weapon

III. THE DENNIS INDICTMENT
By the terms of a 1940 statute commonly known as the Smith
Act, it is a felony to:
[Klnowingly or willfully advocate . .. or teach the duty [or] necessity
... of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States
by force or violence ... [or] to organize... any society, group or assembly of persons who teach [or] advocate ... the overthrow or destruction
of any government in the United States by force or violence .... 32

In 1948, the federal government charged the leaders of the
Communist Party of the United States with conspiracy to violate
that statute by organizing the Party as a group "dedicated to the
Marxist-Leninist principles of the overthrow and destruction of the
33
government of the United States by force and violence."
The indictment represented a novel development in First
Amendment jurisprudence. That Amendment, in relevant part,
prohibits all government action "abridging the freedom of
speech."3 4 Taken literally, that language could prevent government from punishing one who asks another to commit a murder. It
has long been accepted, however, that government may criminalize
the utterance of words which "are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about substantive [crimes]." 35 In that context, Justice Holmes coined a familiar image of the boundary: "The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
36
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic."
The Dennis indictment did not charge that the defendants had
actually taught or advocated the violent overthrow of the government. 37 Instead, it was alleged that they had conspired to do so. 38
In other words, the defendants were charged with having agreed
that at some unspecified future time they would teach and advocate
39
violence against the government.
Such an accusation invites many innovative defenses. Those
range from the hyper-technical-that the Smith Act might be repealed before the ultimate call for violence would be uttered-to the
reasonable proposition-that an agreement to speak is not speech,
32. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 10 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C.

§ 2385 (1976)).
33. United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), affd sub.
nom. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

36. Id.
37. Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 374-75.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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and that although the conspiracy may represent a "clear" danger,
that danger is far from "present."
This paper considers the impact of the Dennis case on the law
of contempt. The legalistic quality of the Dennis issues is suggested
here in summary fashion, for the limited purpose of demonstrating
the background of the contempt proceedings.
IV.

THE CONFRONTATION

The Dennis trial fairly may be termed an antagonistic clash between a zealous anti-communist judge, Harold Medina, and eleven
headstrong communists represented by politically sympathetic lawyers. Yale Law Professor Fred Rodell has described the trial as
"Judge Harold Medina's prosecution of the eleven so-called 'top native Communists.' "40
Dennis defendant Gil Green later wrote a book in which he said
that the defendants, from the start of the trial, viewed Medina as
an adverse partisan. 4 1 From Green's perspective, "If ever there was
a political trial, it was ours," 42 and the defendants had no "illusions
as to how Medina would finally rule on the issue."4 3 Judge Medina
previously had offered a revealing portrayal of the trial ambience:
"And all day in the courtroom the place was full of these Commie
44
sympathizers."
A.

The Judge

The indictment was returned on July 20, 1948, in New York
City. Judge Harold Medina was an experienced lawyer and a colorful personality, and had been a federal judge for about a year. His
official post-Dennis biography casts him an heroic mold, citing such
activities as service as a volunteer preacher during his senior year
at Princeton. 45 That project "began and ended for no reason that
the Judge can now [in 1952] recall,"4 6 but in the biographer's view
it "strongly suggests the sincerity of Harold Medina's beliefs-a
47
sincerity that is equally evident today."
According to the biography, when Medina first entertained the
idea of becoming a judge, he refused to apply through normal political channels because "the idea of ingratiating himself with the
Democratic district leaders in order to further his aspirations jarred
40. FRED RODELL, NINE MEN 302 (1955).
41. GIL GREEN, COLD WAR FUGITWVE 3 (1984).

42. Id. at 45.
43. Id. at 31.
44.
45.

HAROLD MEDINA, THE ANATOMY OF FREEDOM 7
HAWTHORNE DANIEL, JUDGE MEDINA 55 (1952).

46. Id.
47. Id.

(1959).
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on Medina's sensibilities." 48 Later, however, "quite without Medina's knowledge," 49 his name was included on a list of persons
deemed suitable for appointment to the federal bench.5 0 He made
no effort to obtain the position stating, "I wouldn't beg or be put
under any obligation."5 1
Before setting eyes on the defendants, Medina anticipated
trouble. He prepared for the trial by reviewing the experience of a
judge who had presided at a World War II sedition trial of persons
at the opposite end of the political spectrum from the Dennis defendants.5 2 "There had been an awful lot of hell-raising in that
trial, and he had done a lot of things, and I started reading up on
3
[that] trial."5
His biographer portrays Medina's courtroom presence in an heroic image: "Judge Medina entered, serious and dignified in his
black robe .... The Judge sat erect in his leather-upholstered chair,
with the American flag and the great seal of the United States be54
hind him, vividly bright against the somber paneling."
The relationship between Medina and the FBI, which supplied
the prosecution evidence in the Dennis trial, may fairly be described as symbiotic. Throughout the trial, Medina passed judgment on FBI evidence while being guarded by FBI agents, 5 a
situation which would challenge the objectivity of any judge. His
biography, however, states that he was guarded by "police," and
56
makes no mention of FBI participation.
Immediately following conclusion of the trial, FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover wrote a letter to Medina congratulating him "on the
outstanding manner in which [he] conducted the trial"5 7 and added,
"Your fair and impartial conduct of this trial certainly deserves a
prominent place in the annals of American jurisprudence."5 8 The
FBI's file copy of the letter, dated October 17, 1949, bears a supplementary statement in different typescript: "NOTE: According to
current information the eleven Communist defendants are scheduled to be sentenced on October 21, 1949."5 9 The ensuing sentences
were not stigmatized by an excess of compassion.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 207.
DANIEL, supra note 45, at 207-08.
Id. at 210-11.
MEDINA, supra note 44, at 2.
Id.

54. DANIEL, supra note 45, at 285.
55. MEDINA, supra note 44, at 2-3.
56. DANIEL, supra note 45, at 234.
57. Letter from Judge Medina to Herbert Hoover (Nov. 11, 1949) (obtained
from the FBI through the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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After the sentencing, Medina responded thanking Hoover for
his letter and "especially for the protection I received during the
young men
past few months from your very personable and efficient
60
.... [B]oth Mrs. Medina and I really miss them."

At an informal party in the chambers of a Michigan judge
months after the trial had ended, Judge Medina gave an informal
talk to court officers and FBI agents at which he described the trial
"in a very entertaining manner."6 1 He also praised the FBI as "the
62
outstanding development in law enforcement in our generation."
Informed of that compliment, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover wrote
Judge Medina a letter of thanks: "Needless to say I am very gratified and want to write a personal note expressing my appreciation
...

[I hope] that the Bench of our courts will be honored by your

presence for years to come."6 3 Medina responded with a short note:
'Toumay rest assured that I never miss a chance to give the FBI a
64
good pat on the back."
On March 10, 1952, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the contempt judgments which Medina had imposed in the Dennis
case. 6 5 On the following day, the Special Agent in Charge of the
FBI's New York office made a telephone call to its Washington
headquarters, stating that Judge Medina had asked for renewed
protection from the FBI. 66 Although guard duties had been shared

with the New York City police department during the trial, "Judge
Medina did not mention the NYC Police Department in connection
with his request. He further indicated that he was anxious for this
67
protection at once."
The Dennis trial brought Medina to national prominence. He
became something of a folk hero and achieved celebrity stature as a
symbol of resistance to communism. His biographer states that he
received thousands of congratulatory messages, many from luminaries in the fields of politics, entertainment, literature, and even
60. id.
61. Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge of the Detroit FBI office to
Director Hoover (Oct. 2, 1950) (obtained through FOIA request). Although the
information was furnished during 1984, the names of the agents who attended
the party were deleted in the interest of effective law enforcement.
62. Id.
63. Letter from Herbert Hoover to Judge Harold Medina (Oct. 6, 1950) (obtained through FOIA request).
64. Letter from Judge Harold Medina to Herbert Hoover (Oct. 17, 1950) (obtained through FOIA request).
65. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
66. FBI Office Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge of the New York
FBI office (Mar. 11, 1952) (obtained through FOIA request). The memorandum
recites that Medina's request was made to an FBI agent with whom he had
been conversing that morning "inconnection with another matter." Id. The
agent's name was deleted from the copy of the memorandum which the FBI
furnished in 1984, presumably to prevent a compromise of security. Id.
67. Id.
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dethe clergy. 68 Most, however, came from persons whom Medina
69
scribed as "the little people who really make up America."
In 1951, he was nominated for elevation to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (New York area). The processing of
such nominations required a background check by the FBI. Hoover
promptly wrote to Medina to extend his "personal congratulations
on your nomination." 70 The FBI copy of this letter also contains a
supplementary notation: "NOTE: Judge Medina was investigated in
1947 ....Results were favorable. Since that time, relations have
been cordial." 7 1 His promotion was quickly confirmed.
B.

The Defense

The defense lawyers varied widely in the degree of legal skill
exhibited during the trial. Their selection appears to have been
based at least as firmly on ideological affinity with their clients as
on their capacity for defending a complex federal criminal case. It
would be surprising to learn that the defendants exercised independent judgment in their choice of lawyers. Classification of the
Communist Party as a criminal conspiracy is fairly open to challenge from a constitutional perspective. It cannot be doubted, however, that the Party was a monolithic organization, and that the
Dennis defendants accepted Party discipline.
That proposition is confirmed forcefully by Dennis Defendant
Green. He recites that after the convictions had been affirmed on
appeal, the Party concluded that it would have "to work in a twilight zone of semi-legality-at best."72 The Party's National Board,
therefore, decided "that a majority of the defendants would begin
doing their time, while a smaller number remained outside of
prison to work in an underground capacity. All defendants were
"7 3
urged to prepare for either eventuality.
On the weekend before the defendants were required to surrender, a farewell party was held at the office of the Party newspaper,
Daily Worker. During that party, Green "was called aside by a
member of the Secretariat and told I was one of those chosen not7 5to
74
Reluctantly, Green obeyed the order.
surrender on Monday."
Throughout the trial the defense attempted to show that the
Party was a legitimate and constitutionally protected political or68. DANIEL, supra note 45, at 293.
69. Id.
70. Letter from Herbert Hoover to Judge Harold Medina (June 12, 1951)
(obtained through FOIA request).
71. Id.
72. GREEN, supra note 41, at 57.
73. Id. at 58.
74. Id. at 59.
75. Id.
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ganization. That defense of the Party was consistent with a claim
of innocence on behalf of the individual defendants. It was the
prosecution thesis that the defendants were guilty because the
Party, which they had formed, was a criminal organization. The
prosecution's reliance on classic Marxist doctrine to prove defendants' violent intent, invited a defense designed to show that the defendants' acts and statements did not contemplate violence and
were constitutionally proper political activities protected by the
First Amendment.
The defendants' trial tactics, however, were at least equally
consistent with an attempt to use the trial as a sounding board for
their demand for establishment of a society based on their notion of
social justice. They presented an extensive attack on the system for
selection of both grand jurors and trial jurors, claiming that the
procedure was biased against the economically and racially disfavored. Given many chances to make a record showing of judicial
bias, they forfeited most of those opportunities by electing to engage
the trial court in quarrelsome bickering. Often in the presence of
the jury, they attacked other judges, the media, the Department of
Justice, and other federal officials including the President. No
thoughtful lawyer would have believed that such tactics would persuade the jury to acquit. A reading of the turgid trial record instills
the conjecture that the defense may have abandoned hope for an
acquittal and was engaged in an attempt to provoke a mistrial.
C.

The Opening Round

It is not the purpose of this paper to present a complete study of
the Dennis trial dynamic. Justice could be done to such an undertaking only through a book-length analysis. The litigation encompasses many thousands of pages of trial records and more than a
dozen appellate judgments. Various aspects of the case were considered in no less than five formal opinions by the United States
76
Supreme Court.
The present undertaking is limited to an attempt to impart a
sense of the context in which the Dennis contempt proceedings
arose, and an appreciation of the extent to which the attitudes and
personalities of the actors responded to, and ultimately reinforced,
the political temper of the times.
76. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (affirming contempt convictions based on failure to surrender to serve the Smith Act sentences); Sacher v.
Ass'n of the Bar of New York, 347 U.S. 388 (1954) (declining to disbar another
Dennis lawyer); In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953) (disbarring one of the Dennis lawyers for trial misconduct); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952)
(affirming the contempt convictions based on trial misconduct); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (affirming the Smith Act convictions).
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The Dennis defendants initially mounted a multi-phased attack on the proceeding, with challenges against jury selection procedures, the constitutional validity of the charge, and the
sufficiency of the indictment. At the arraignment, the defense lawyers requested a period of ninety days within which to prepare their
pre-trial motions. Judge Medina looked at the indictment and reacted with shock: "Why, these men are charged with conspiracy to
teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force and
77
violence."
The defense lawyers emphasized the difficulty and complexity
of the case. Judge Medina responded:
If the difficulty and complexity has to do with over-throwing the government by force, I should think that public policy might require that
the matter be given prompt attention and not just held off indefinitely
when perhaps
there may be some more of these fellows up to that sort
of thing.78
Judge Medina was not impressed when the defense lawyers
pointed out that no act of force, violence, or attempt to overthrow
the government had been charged. His answer was succinct: "No,
they want to wait until they get everything set and then the acts
will come."

79

Based on Medina's remarks, the defendants asked him to disqualify himself on grounds of prejudice against the defendants.
Their request was denied. They then asked the Court of Appeals to
remove Medina. That court denied their request, pointing out that
the prosecutor had prefaced his argument before Judge Medina
with the words, "If it be a fact that these men have done what the
indictment charges."8 0 Judge Medina's comments, however, had
not been given in the context of a similar qualifying hypothesis.
The defendants, in turn, paid little heed to the notion of judicial
decorum during their appearances before Medina. They frequently
argued on their own behalf, sometimes in a boisterous manner,
against his rulings.8 1
D.

The Contempt Judgments

The trial proceeded in an atmosphere of overt mutual hostility.
After weeks of unseemly wrangling between the judge and the defense, four of the defendants were jailed in mid-trial. One defendant, Gates, was confined for refusing to answer a question on cross77. DANIEL, supra note 45, at 218.
78. Foster v. Medina, 170 F.2d 632, 633 (2d Cir. 1949).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Sacher, 9 F.R.D. 394, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);

United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d

416, 444-45 (1950) (contempt count XXVII).
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examination.8 2 Two others, Hall and Winston, were imprisoned for
protesting the action against Gates.8 3 The fourth, Gil Green, subsequently the author of Cold War Fugitive,8 4 was incarcerated
when Judge Medina excluded a document which the defense tried
to introduce during Green's testimony. At that time, Green stated
"inan angry, sarcastic manner, 'I thought we were going to be given
a chance to prove our case. That article was germane to the very
heart of the issue.'"85 As a witness, Green had no right to argue
the question of admissibility of the document. The incarceration
was affirmed, however, because Judge Medina had certified that
the statement had been made "in an angry, sarcastic manner"; because Green had made other unspecified statements "beyond the
scope of responsive answers when, and as, he pleased"; and because
86
he had participated in the Hall-Winston outburst.
Ultimately, all defendants were convicted of Smith Act violations. Each received a sentence of five years imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine with the exception of one defendant who, because he
had received the Distinguished Service Cross during World War II,
87
was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
Immediately after the jury had returned its verdict, Judge Medina stated, "Now I turn to some unfinished business." He read
portions of a lengthy order holding the defense lawyers in contempt,
which he had prepared in advance of the verdict. He proceeded to
impose prison sentences upon each of them, without permitting
them to speak in their own behalf or holding any form of hearing.8 8
The sentences ranged from thirty days to six months.8 9
As applied to the trial conduct of members of the bar, Medina's
sentences had no precedent. Professor Rodell treats the action as
freakish: "Judge Medina sentenced the Communists' lawyers,"90 he
writes, underscoring the word. 9 1
A judge who imposes summary contempt punishment is required to prepare a certificate reciting the facts which constituted
82. United States v. Gates, 176 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1949). Gates had given
testimony concerning a pamphlet which he had prepared. Id. at 79. On crossexamination he was asked for the names of the persons who had assisted in its
preparation. Id. He refused to answer on First amendment (freedom of speech
and association) and Fifth amendment (self-incrimination) grounds, and persisted after being ordered to answer, stating that he did not want to be a "stool
pigeon." Id.
83. United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 1949).
84. See generally GREEN, supra note 41.
85. United States v. Green, 176 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1949).
86. Id. at 172.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

DANIEL, supra note 45, at 292.

Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 14 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir. 1949).
RODELL, supra note 40, at 320.
Id.
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the contempt. 92 The purpose of the certificate is to enable a reviewing court to decide whether the contempt judgment is legally justified. Judge Medina's order was prepared in compliance with that
requirement, and was later published as a formal federal
93
decision.
The transcript presents a trial dynamic which may be interpreted as a series of disrespectful statements directed against
Judge Medina by defense counsel. With equal legitimacy, the transcript may be viewed as a series of denigrating and intemperate
comments directed against defense counsel by the judge. One can
gain a sense of the flavor of the trial by comparing the defense comments quoted in Judge Medina's contempt certificate with his own
statements preceding those comments.
Dissenting from the
Supreme Court's affirmance of the contempt convictions, 94 Justice
Felix Frankfurter undertook a comparison between the defense remarks which Judge Medina found to be contemptuous and the
statements by Judge Medina which preceded those remarks. The
contrast is enlightening.
For example, defense lawyer Louis McCabe was held in contempt for stating that the judge's accusations of defense misconduct
seemed always to come at times corresponding to newspaper deadlines. Judge Medina's certificate paints the episode as a gratuitous
insult. 95 Justice Frankfurter points out that it was preceded by
defense objections to judicial interruptions, to which Medina's colorful response included such inelegances as, "If you don't like it you
can lump it," and a refusal "to sit here like a bump on a log."9 6
A contempt citation against another defense lawyer, Harry
Sacher, was based on Judge Medina's finding that he had commenced a legal argument without permission, had shouted, and had
desisted only when advised "that he was proceeding in direct and
wilful disobedience of the direction of the court."9 7 Justice Frankfurter quotes the preceding portion of the transcript which shows
that Judge Medina had called Sacher a liar and added, "I do not
take your word for anything."9 8 The Court of Appeals for the Sec92. Although such a certificate is an indispensable element of due process,
in federal proceedings it also is required by FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a).
93. United States v. Sacher, 9 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The certificate
also appears as an appendix to the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the
contempt convictions in United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir.

1950).
94. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 23 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
95. United States v. Sacher, 9 F.R.D. 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); 182 F.2d
416, 436 (2d Cir. 1950) (contempt citation IX).
96. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 62-63.

97. United States v. Sacher, 9 F.R.D. 394, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); 182 F.2d
416, 445 (2d Cir. 1950) (contempt citation XXVII).
98. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 80.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:3

ond Circuit held that the record did not support Medina's claim that
Sacher had lied, although it affirmed Sacher's contempt sentence
on other counts. 99
Frankfurter's opinion provides an extensive comparison between the portions of the trial transcript selected by Medina as
grounds for contempt judgments, and the portions preceding those
excerpts which tend to demonstrate judicial provocation. The lesson which emerges is that when one's adversary is also the referee
it is useless to protest that he struck the first blow.
After the contempt judgments were pronounced, Sacher made a
statement which Justice Hugo Black found "relevant and dignified."10 0 Medina responded by calling it "brazen" and "mealymouth." 10 1 Commenting on that episode, Black remarked that
Sacher's "decorum and dignity... loses nothing by comparison with
10 2
others."
In its subsequent affirmance of the Smith Act convictions, the
court of appeals made an observation in support of Medina's conduct which might, with equal logic, have provided the basis for setting aside the contempt judgments: "True, it does not follow,
because the attorneys misbehaved that the judge may not have
misbehavior and
done so too .... Nevertheless, the question of their
10 3
his misconduct cannot be entirely separated."
E. The Appeal from the Contempt Judgments
An appeal from a contempt judgment is among the most challenging undertakings known to advocacy. Unless the record clearly
shows that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that its legal conclusions do not follow from its recitations of fact, the contempt judgment is almost certain to be affirmed.
The reason is obvious. It is difficult if not impossible to recreate the atmosphere of a proceeding by reading the typed record
of that proceeding. Reading Hamlet will not enable one to visualize
Sir Lawrence Olivier's performance in its title role. Reviewing
courts do not hear evidence concerning the events which occurred at
trial. They simply accept the trial judge's written statement
describing those events. Such statements cannot be contradicted.
The trial judge's certification has been regarded as conclusive from
the earliest days of English appellate review. It follows that,
although counsel may argue with a trial judge, the judge can win
any argument by exercising his contempt power. Thus, a record
99. Sacher, 182 F.2d 424-25 (2d Cir. 1950).

100. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 17 (Black, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. Footnote 4 on that page contains the portion of Sacher's statement
which preceded Judge Medina's interruption. Id. at 17 n.4.
103. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 225 (2d Cir. 1950).
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statement, not contemptuous per se, can become so if the trial judge
certifies that it was made "in a sarcastic and impertinent
104
manner."
A further impediment to appeal is the natural empathy of
judges of reviewing courts toward their colleagues in the lower
courts. Many, if not most, appellate judges began their judicial careers in the trial courts and are keenly alert to the problems confronting judges who preside in those courts.
The Dennis defendants were faced with an additional handicap. At that time, the word "communist" was an epithet and actionable as defamation.10 5 Courts were not anxious to indulge such
persons with technical niceties.
If one's inquiry be limited to the face of Judge Medina's certificate, the Dennis defense lawyers were guilty of contempt. The
court of appeals correctly so held,' 0 6 adding that judicial provocation will not justify a contemptuous retaliation; the only remedy is
10 7
through appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also considered the
contention that the contempt proceedings were procedurally defective. As previously noted, the judgments were pronounced without
notice and without an opportunity for response. Notice and an opportunity to be heard traditionally have been regarded as the basic
elements of due process of law.' 0 8 The concept of summary contempt punishment has been justified on the premise that immediate action may be required in order to prevent disruption of the
proceeding. The Dennis defense lawyers were not punished until
the trial had been concluded. There was no arguable need to dispense with notice and hearing. The United States Supreme Court
had never decided whether the power to impose summary punishment was limited to situations requiring immediate action. Resolving the issue in the context of the prosecution of subversion, the
court of appeals cited marginal authority and held, with one judge
dissenting, that the contempt power had been exercised with reasonable promptness and that to have imposed punishment earlier
might have disrupted the trial. 0 9
The Supreme Court initially declined to review the case, but
then granted certiorari limited to the procedural issue because of
its perception of "the importance of clarifying the permissible prac104. E.g., Sacher, 9 F.R.D. at 401,404 (contempt count XI); Sacher, 182 F.2d
437, 439 (count XVII).
105. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. 11. 1969);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 326 (1974).
106. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 418-28 (2d Cir. 1950).
107. Id. at 430.
108. See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-91 (1898).
109. Sacher, 182 F.2d at 429-30.
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tice in [contempt] cases." 1 10 The Court resolved the issue by holding that summary contempt may be imposed in any case in which
the offense occurs in the presence of the judge, and that the judge in
his discretion may elect to act immediately or to wait until his action will not prejudice the trial.11 1 Justices Black, Frankfurter, and
Douglas dissented on the procedural issue. As previously noted
here, Black and Frankfurter went further, making a detailed analysis of the fifteen-volume trial record. Frankfurter described the
proceeding as:
[M]ore suggestive of an undisciplined debating society than of the hush
and solemnity of a court of justice. Too often counsel were encouraged
to vie with the court in dialectic, in repartee and banter .... [Judge
Medina] failed to exercise the moral authority of a court possessed of a
great tradition. He indulged [defense counsel],
sometimes resignedly,
112
sometimes playfully, in lengthy speeches.
The outcome, however, was that one of the debaters was able to
incarcerate the others. In approving that result, the Supreme
Court undertook to respond to the concerns of those who feared that
lawyers representing unpopular clients might become special
targets of mediatropic judges. Given the Sacher-Dennis result,
however, the consolation extended by the Court to the legal profession may consist more in form than in substance:
The profession knows that no lawyer is at the mercy of a single federal
trial judge ....

[T]his Court, if its aid be needed, will unhesitatingly

protect counsel in fearless, vigorous and effective performance of every
duty pertaining to the office of advocate on behalf of any person
whomsoever.113

The Supreme Court held that the fact that the Dennis counsel
had not been yet served their contempt sentences demonstrated the
availability of reflective consideration in contempt cases. 1 14 Those
lawyers had avoided incarceration pending review, however, only
because Judge Medina elected to grant bail, perhaps to avoid legal
complications in the defendants' post-trial motions and appeals. In
current practice, bail on appeal from summary contempt judgments
is the exception rather than the rule. 115
110. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1952).
111. Id. at 11.
112. Id. at 38.
113. Id. at 12-13.
114. Id.
115. Even at that time, there was no right to bail in contempt proceedings.
Bail pending appeal was denied in a different Dennis-related contempt case.
Field v. United States, 193 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1951). The Supreme Court's reassurance may be viewed as directed exclusively to the legal profession, and Field
did not involve contempt by a lawyer. There was, however, no precedent upon
which to base a prediction that lawyers would be treated differently from
others.
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The Court also took note of the extensive legal and judicial experience of the judges of the court of appeals who reviewed the contempt convictions.' 16 But as previously noted, the appellate judges
proceeded from the premise that Judge Medina's contempt certificate was unimpeachable.
Thus, the appellate protective mechanism cited by the
Supreme Court may be ephemeral in most cases. Reliance upon
the Court's offer of its own protection is likely to be even more unrealistic. It is the very rare petition for review which is granted by
that Court, and the procedures for obtaining that review are cumbersome. It also is worthy of note that the Court's offer of protection was extended in the same opinion which affirmed the
convictions of the Dennis lawyers, although two members of the
Court believed that those convictions were unjustified.
V.

CONTEMPT BECOMES A FELONY

At the time of the Dennis prosecution, there was no federal
statute which criminalized bail-jumping."17 When the absconding
Dennis defendants were apprehended, they were charged with contempt of court on the theory that their failure to appear constituted
defiance of an order of court. That was an innovative employment
of the contempt remedy; at common law, bail-jumping was not considered contempt, and there was no precedent for so treating the
8
offense."1
By that time, Judge Medina was sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The contempts were not processed in a
summary manner because the facts were not known to the judge
then presiding. In keeping with the contempt practice at that time,
however, the defendants were denied jury trials.
Sentences of three years and more were imposed. 119 Those
sentences squarely posed the constitutional issue whether contempt penalties exceeding one year can be imposed without affording the contemnor the constitutional protection granted to persons
accused of felonies. Those rights include prohibition of prosecutions
unless commenced by grand jury indictment, and the right to trial
by jury.
116. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 13 (1952).
117. A statute penalizing bail-jumping was enacted in 1954. Immunity Act
of 1954, 68 Stat. 747 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 3486). Its purpose was
"to fill the void." 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (68 Stat.) 3213.
118. See United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1952).
119. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (imposing sentence of three
years); United States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1954) (imposing sentence of four years); United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1952) (imposing sentence of three years).
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The contemnors appealed to the Supreme Court. 120 In doing
so, they did not claim an entitlement to trial by jury. 1 2 1 Their principal arguments were that contempt sentences could not lawfully
exceed one year, but that if greater sentences are to be authorized
the contempt charge can only be made by grand jury indictment.
The Supreme Court denied both claims. It held that a one-year
limitation was unjustified because the relevant statute authorized
federal courts to punish contempt "at its discretion."1 2 2 It also rejected the grand jury argument, holding that it would be anomalous
to apply the Fifth Amendment grand jury clause to cases not covered by the Sixth Amendment provision for jury trial. 1 23 Finally, it
specifically approved the three-year sentences as a proper exercise
12 4
of the trial court's discretion.
VI.

CONTEMPT PROCESS BECOMES A WEAPON FOR UNMASKING
COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS

Bail for the Dennis defendants had been provided by the "Bail
Fund of the Civil Rights Congress of New York." One of the three
trustees of the Fund included Dashiell Hammett, 125 a well-known
author of detective stories.
Contributions had been solicited
through an appeal to concern for civil liberties, and with a promise
of anonymity. The latter assurance had been essential since a contribution to a fund for the benefit of accused communists would be
regarded by many as ground for questioning the contributor's loyalty to the United States.
When four of the defendants failed to surrender as required,
the Fund forfeited the amount of their bail. The trustees of the
Fund, however, were summoned to court, ordered to produce the
records of the Fund, and questioned concerning the identity of the
contributors. On their refusal to answer and produce records, they
were sentenced to imprisonment for six months or until they would
126
comply with the order.
The rationale of the questioning was that the Fund contributors might know where the absconding defendants were hiding.
That notion seems questionable since public questioning of those
contributors would be sufficient in itself to assure that the absconding defendants would simply move to a place of which the contributors had no knowledge. It seems very probable that disclosure of
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
Id. at 183.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 188-89.
See United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 94.
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the names would have been followed by public questioning of the
contributors before a court or congressional committee.
In conducting the inquiry, the court was acting in effect as a
"one-man grand jury," a practice which had been held improper in
earlier cases. The court of appeals distinguished those cases from
the Bail Fund situation on the basis that the judge had a right to
investigate the reasons for disobedience of his order that the Dennis
127
defendants surrender to serve their Smith Act sentences.
A federal grand jury commenced a companion inquiry, seeking
the same information. Again, the trustees refused to cooperate and
received six-month contempt sentences which were affirmed on
appeal.128
The contempt proceedings against one Abner Green' 2 9 are of
interest in this connection. Abner Green, who had no known relationship to Dennis defendant Gil Green, was an officer of the Bail
Fund. He also had an official position with a different organization
entitled The American Committee for the Foreign Born. Because
he held office in both entities, the grand jury asked for records of
both. On his failure to comply, he received a six month contempt
sentence. His protest that the Foreign Born records were not material to the grand jury's Dennis-basedinquiry was rejected with the
observation that a grand jury witness is not entitled to raise the
question of materiality, and that in any event the Court was "con130
vinced that the documents here sought were material."
VII.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DENNIS-SACHER

CONTEMPTS

The Dennis litigation occurred during the transition from the
Vinson to the Warren Era. In only one respect, however, have the
principles enunciated in the Dennis contempts been reversed. In
Bloom v. Illinois,13 1 the Court adopted the view expressed by Justice Black as a dissenter in Sacher13 2 by granting to persons accused of contempt the right to a jury trial if the sentence is to
exceed six months. As a result, at the commencement of a contempt
prosecution, the court must determine whether a sentence exceeding six months will be sought. If so, the alleged contemnor must be
offered a jury trial.
The only other restriction on the length of a contempt sentence
is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments."1 3 3 The threshold of cruelty has not been delineated
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 96.
United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1951).
Green v. United States, 193 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 113.
391 U.S. 194 (1968).
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 14, 20 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).

133. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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for purposes of that provision, but it is clear that a four year sentence is not improper per se.
The most durable impact of the Dennis contempts is the enhanced potential for abuse of the contempt power, with consequent
vulnerability of litigants to the idiosyncratic reaction of a trial
judge. The most durable lesson is that the judicial system may not
always serve as a protector of individual rights.

